SHRINCS researchers publish draft post-quantum security analysis
The SHRINCS draft examines signature sizes and wallet state management. Its authors warn it needs further independent review and is not ready for deployment.

Researchers behind SHRINCS have published a draft security analysis of a post-quantum signature construction being developed for Bitcoin. Mikhail Kudinov's paper is dated November 18, 2026; wording clarifications were committed to the repository on November 19. It examines the trade-off between smaller signatures and the need to preserve wallet signing state. This is research, rather than an activated Bitcoin upgrade.
What SHRINCS proposes
The construction combines two hash-based signing paths under one public key. Its main, stateful path aims for more compact signatures. A larger stateless fallback avoids relying on the same record of previously used one-time signing keys.
For one proposed stateful configuration, the first signature occupies 548 bytes, while the fallback occupies 5,777 bytes. These are signature sizes under the draft's parameters, not complete Bitcoin transaction sizes or quoted dollar fees. Additional data can increase block-space costs, but the paper does not establish a future network fee schedule.
The central wallet challenge is state management. Signing software must correctly track used elements so that a one-time key is not reused for different messages. Restoring a seed phrase alone cannot reconstruct that record. The described design switches to larger stateless signatures if state is lost, corrupted or exhausted. That is a requirement for a possible implementation, not a feature newly available in ordinary Bitcoin wallets.
What remains unverified
The analysis repository explicitly warns that its documents have not yet received sufficient peer review or independent auditing. The authors acknowledge possible errors in statements, proofs and concrete figures. Security bounds depend on their stated models, assumptions and parameters; they do not guarantee protection against implementation bugs, side channels or key-management mistakes.
Publishing the analysis lets researchers examine those assumptions separately from the specification. It does not mean holders should already move BTC to a new address type or install experimental signing software. Consensus adoption and wallet support are separate questions.
SHRINCS explores a possible way to authorize transactions if Bitcoin adopts post-quantum protection in the future. The paper does not itself demonstrate a quantum attack against the live network or establish when such an attack might become possible. Our recovery-phrase guide explains the role of wallet backups; the Bitcoin page provides network and market context.



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