Gonka bridge exploit: signing keys, WGNK and loss estimates
Tracking the Gonka Ethereum bridge exploit: a changed BLS key, stablecoin withdrawals and WGNK minting. Why the $1.05M estimate remains preliminary.

Contents
Blockaid reported an exploit of Gonka's Ethereum bridge on November 18, 2026, estimating approximately $1.05 million in realized value. Researchers described a changed group key, stablecoin withdrawals and unbacked WGNK minting. The complete cause, final loss and recovery outcome remain unresolved in the reviewed primary reports.
What we know now
- Blockaid reported a changed epoch BLS group key used to withdraw reserves and mint WGNK.
- Its approximately $1.05 million estimate across about five transactions describes conditions at the November 18, 1:28 PM ET alert. It is not a confirmed final net loss.
- TraceFast separately identified withdrawals of 884,150.87 USDT and 647.74 USDC, alongside the creation of 22 million WGNK.
- The reviewed sources do not contain a verified Gonka announcement confirming containment, restored backing or compensation.
- Why the contract accepted the key change remains unresolved. The reports do not establish compromise of Ethereum as a whole or every Gonka node.
How it happened
According to Gonka's documentation, its Ethereum bridge and WGNK token share the same contract address: 0x972a7a92d92796a98801a8818bcf91f1648f2f68. Native GNK is locked on Gonka while WGNK represents it on Ethereum. Minting tokens and releasing bridge assets require authorization.
The documentation describes a current epoch BLS group key and a sequence of updates: a new key must be signed by the previous one. Anyone can submit an update transaction using valid public data. An ordinary wallet submitting such a transaction therefore does not, by itself, establish legitimate signing authority or prove a specific access-control vulnerability.
Blockaid links the exploit to a replacement key followed by stablecoin withdrawals and WGNK creation without corresponding backing. However, documentation of intended operation is not a root-cause analysis of the incident. A stolen private key, forged signature, historical-epoch issue or particular software defect should not be asserted without additional evidence.
Timeline
- November 18, 7:08 AM ET. TraceFast says the observed address received 0.05 ETH. That transfer alone does not establish the controller's identity or the ultimate origin of its funds.
- November 18, 1:01 PM ET. The researcher identifies withdrawals of 884,150.87 USDT and 647.74 USDC from the bridge.
- November 18, 1:02 PM ET. Its report records 22 million WGNK minted. This is a token quantity, not established dollar proceeds.
- November 18, 1:28 PM ET. Blockaid published its exploit alert and approximately $1.05 million provisional estimate. Its description of an ongoing attack applies to that moment.
- November 18, 1:33 PM ET. TraceFast published its transfer breakdown and reported a USDT swap through UniswapX. Any balance in that report is a historical snapshot rather than a current reading.
Where the funds went
TraceFast associates the activity with 0x6650a1cb0c3b970a0e4ced26984fe06db7844d80 and reports that USDT was exchanged through UniswapX. A blockchain swap does not amount to a cash withdrawal: it records a change of asset without establishing the ultimate recipient's identity or a completed realization of every stolen asset.
The specified stablecoins total $884,798.61 nominally, assuming $1 per token. That differs from Blockaid's realized-value estimate. The figures cannot be added together, and the gap should not be attributed to sales of newly minted WGNK without verified trades. A reconciled accounting of realized value and remaining assets is still needed.
The response from teams and exchanges
The reviewed reports do not establish a compensation plan, recovery bounty, inventory of exchange-frozen funds or completed Gonka post-mortem. These gaps do not show that the team is doing nothing; they mean that a particular outcome has not been confirmed by an accessible primary announcement.
The documentation describes normal bridge operations and does not establish that the bridge is safe to use after the incident. Likewise, a previous audit cannot replace an investigation into the deployed contracts and signing arrangements involved in this event.
What it means for holders
For WGNK, the relationship between issued tokens and escrowed GNK is central. A report of unbacked issuance warrants reconciliation but does not automatically establish that every WGNK token lacks backing. An individual holder's exposure depends on their position and subsequent project actions.
This timeline does not include a separately verified WGNK price series. Changes in ETH should not be presented as a measured reaction to this particular attack. Further updates require new primary evidence about signing control, contract status, backing and recovery.
See the initial news report and our cross-chain bridge explainer.
This is not investment advice.
This story is developing. We follow new evidence and update this timeline. Last updated November 18, 2026, 04:48 PM ET.



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