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Fluidkey hack explained: how $1.6M was stolen

Timeline of the Nov. 19, 2026 Fluidkey hack: at least $1.58M drained in 36 minutes on six chains, 881.6 ETH sent to Tornado Cash, wallet back online.

Fluidkey hack explained: how $1.6M was stolen
Developing storyWe are following events and adding new information. Last updated: November 20, 2026, 9:48 PM ET
Contents
  1. What we know now
  2. How it happened
  3. Timeline
  4. Where the money went
  5. What the team and exchanges did
  6. What it means for holders

For 36 minutes on Nov. 19, from 12:28 to 1:04 PM ET, privacy wallet Fluidkey's own relayer paid money out of user accounts on six chains at once. Bitquery traced at least $1.58 million to wallets tied to a single attacker, and up to $1.64 million counting payouts to unidentified addresses. That afternoon, 881.6 ETH went into the Tornado Cash mixer. Fluidkey brought the wallet back on Nov. 20 as v1.79.22 and blames flaws in a third-party logging tool.

What we know now

  • Losses are $1.58 million to $1.64 million across Base, Ethereum, BNB Chain, Optimism, Polygon and Arbitrum (Bitquery). An independent tracker counted about $1.63 million across seven chains (CryptoSlate). Fluidkey has not published its own total.
  • The wallet has been back since 11:10 AM ET on Nov. 20 as v1.79.22 on web, iOS and Android. Older versions are blocked, so users must update before they can send funds (Fluidkey).
  • According to the team, the attacker used flaws in a third-party logging tool to obtain session data, prepared transfers on Fluidkey's servers and had them signed when a user opened the app. Fluidkey says private keys never left users' devices.
  • Nearly all the stolen funds were swapped to ETH and sent to Tornado Cash, 881.6 ETH in total. From there the on-chain trail goes cold.
  • Fluidkey is investigating with SEAL 911, plans to contact each affected user and has promised a full post-mortem. No compensation plan has been announced.

How it happened

Fluidkey is a wallet for private payments on Ethereum and layer-2 networks. Each incoming payment lands in a fresh stealth address, a separate Safe smart wallet, so outsiders cannot add up what one person holds. Those new addresses have no ETH for gas, so Fluidkey sends and pays for users' transactions itself through a relayer: a service wallet and a Fluidkey smart contract on each chain (Bitquery).

The spending key stays with the user in the browser or app. The attacker did not steal it. Instead, Fluidkey says, they pulled session data through a third-party logging tool, used it to prepare transfers on Fluidkey's servers, and the user's app signed them when opened. In other words, keeping keys on the device does not help if the server side can hand the user malicious operations to sign. Bitquery points out that a 2024 Dedaub audit warned a breach of Fluidkey's servers could be used to serve users harmful code. The team has not named the logging tool; details are expected in the post-mortem.

Per Bitquery, the attacker prepared hours in advance. Two fresh wallets were funded with ETH from Tornado Cash and sent small amounts of ETH to other chains for gas. Just before the drain, the attacker made tiny deposits to three Fluidkey accounts on Base and ran a 5.15 USDC test transfer. Bitquery reads this as picking targets ahead of time.

Timeline

  • Nov. 19, about five hours before the main drain. A possible first run: four new Ethereum wallets each received roughly $4,500 from Fluidkey accounts. The independent tracker gives about a 60% chance it was the same attacker. Bitquery found no link and left these out of its count (Bitquery).
  • Nov. 19, 12:16 PM ET. Test transfer: a Fluidkey account on Base sent 5.15 USDC to an address that later received gas from the attacker.
  • Nov. 19, 12:28 PM ET. The main drain began on Ethereum and Base within seconds of each other. The largest single transaction took $415,783 in USDT from two Ethereum accounts.
  • Nov. 19, 12:33 PM ET. Five minutes in, half of the attacker's haul had already been paid out.
  • Nov. 19, 1:04:59 PM ET. The relayer's last transaction. In the hour from noon ET it sent 174 transactions; on a normal day it never topped 30 an hour.
  • Nov. 19, 1:05 PM ET. Fluidkey took all services offline. It later said no unauthorized transactions had gone through since (Fluidkey).
  • Nov. 19, 1:20 PM ET. Fluidkey's first warning on X: it was aware of an incident and told users not to use the website or app.
  • Nov. 19, 3:05⁠–⁠4:29 PM ET. Six wallets made 59 deposits totaling 881.6 ETH, about $1.57 million, into Tornado Cash (Bitquery).
  • Nov. 19, 3:17 PM ET. Fluidkey's second update: it was working with SEAL 911 to investigate and trace funds; the web app and all APIs stayed paused; a full post-mortem would follow.
  • Nov. 20, 11:10 AM ET. Fluidkey came back as v1.79.22 and first described the cause: flaws in a third-party logging tool. It said transfers can no longer be prepared that way and added extra safeguards.
  • Nov. 20. Bitquery published an on-chain investigation breaking down every relayer payout and listing the attacker's addresses.

Where the money went

Base and Ethereum accounts lost the most: Bitquery counts $837,000 to the attacker from Base and $660,000 from Ethereum, with the rest from BNB Chain, Optimism, Polygon and Arbitrum. Almost all of it was stablecoins: USDC on Base, USDT and USDC on Ethereum. On BNB Chain the relayer also paid out about $13,500 of Ondo tokenized stocks (NVIDIA, Apple, Alphabet, S&P 500), of which $5,500 reached the attacker.

The rest followed a familiar playbook. Collector wallets swapped the stablecoins for ETH; one Ethereum swap wallet had passed on 352 ETH by 12:44 PM ET. Funds on Base were bridged to Ethereum via Mayan and HiFiSwap, with 125 ETH arriving through HiFiSwap alone. Six wallets then sent 881.6 ETH to Tornado Cash, roughly what was stolen. The largest depositor, 0xd3a9d27ad80ff9528e158bffa9752f8a88024eea, put in 349.3 ETH. The full address list is in Bitquery's report.

Not every relayer payout went to the attacker. About $349,000 went to wallets with a history, most likely the owners themselves or exchange deposit addresses. One user moved $277,000 during the attack to a wallet in use since 2024. Another $65,000 went to new addresses that could not be tied either to the attacker or to owners, some of it on to Coinbase and Binance.

Bots also sprayed fake tokens named ETH, USDC and USDT between the attacker's wallets in matching amounts. This is address poisoning, aimed at anyone who copies an address from their transaction history.

What the team and exchanges did

By the time Fluidkey took its services offline, the drain had already ended. A day later it shipped v1.79.22, blocked every older version and brought in SEAL 911, a volunteer team that helps crypto projects during hacks. It also warned about impersonators, saying its staff never contact users privately on social media (CryptoSlate).

No exchange freezes or bounty offer have been reported. Funds already in Tornado Cash cannot be frozen.

What it means for holders

Fluidkey has no token, so the damage falls on wallet users whose accounts the relayer drained. Fluidkey asks users with funds in the service to update to v1.79.22 and wait to hear from the team through official support. An unfamiliar transfer can be checked in the relevant chain's block explorer by receiving address or transaction hash. CryptoSlate notes that Fluidkey's recovery guide describes a tool called SARA for reaching funds outside the app, which the team calls a last resort.

The hack highlights a wider risk for wallets where the server prepares transactions and the user only signs. Keeping the keys is not enough if nobody checks what is actually being signed.

This is not investment advice.

This story is developing: we are following events and adding new information. Last updated Nov. 20, 9:50 PM ET.

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#Fluidkey#hack#wallet#privacy#Tornado Cash#SEAL 911#timeline
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